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Abstract  
The debate on foreign economic relations has stressed the expansion and diversification of 
trade as well as the need for increased inflow in foreign capital. As a distinct area of 
international relations and development studies, foreign economic relations has increased the 
prospect for sustained economic growth and development, especially among emerging 
economies. Indeed, the competition for markets and resources remain the greatest 
determinants for friends as well as foes. To this end, the study interrogates the complexities 
of Nigeria’s foreign economic relations with the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) economies, whose development models can arguably serve as prototypes for 
other emerging economies. It adopts the theories of modernization and 
underdevelopment/dependency (UDT) to situate the dynamics of these relationships within 
perspective. The study is based on content analysis and review, drawing attention to the 
forces and factors that drive these relationships. Findings suggest that failure on the part of 
the traditional international financial institutions (IMF and World Bank) to meet the growing 
expectations of these developing economies is singularly responsible for regional re-
alignments on their part to maximize the gains of globalization. It concludes that a re-
evaluation of the policies of the IMF and the World Bank is long overdue, while proposing an 
introduction of more robust regional economic integration to meet the increasing demands in 
South-South Cooperation. 
Keywords: Nigeria, BRICS, Developing Economies, Foreign Economic Relations, 
South-South Cooperation   
 
1 Introduction  
There has been a fundamental change in international economy, especially so in the last 
decade. Emerging and developing countries have significantly increased their weight in 
global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and especially in global economic growth; in 
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particular, they have been responsible for most of the growth in the world economy since the 
2007-2008 global financial crisis (Sen, 2000; Sachs, 2005 and 2011; Herbst and Mills, 2012; 
Griffith-Jones, 2014). Indeed, among these emerging economies, few countries have been 
held in equal measures of consternation and admiration as Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa, known collectively as BRICS. The extent to which they have transformed their 
economies and extended their tentacles across the world within a relatively short period of 
time have been subject to intense interest and debates (Alao, 2011; Chidozie, 2014). These 
discussions are informed by two dominant positions; while some view their rapid economic 
development as possible templates for other developing countries to attain the economic 
advancement that has eluded them since independence, others believe that aspects of their 
policies caution against using the BRICS, or at least some of them as models for developing 
nations (Alao, 2011:5). 
More fundamentally, the BRICS account for 40% of the world’s population and 20% of the 
world’s GDP (CNN.com, 2014). In addition, the recently concluded plans and the consequent 
announcement by the BRICS leaders to set up BRICS Development Bank (BDB) which 
would fund long-term investment in infrastructure and more sustainable development in these 
countries have heightened the suspicion of the international community and improved the 
global reputation of these emerging economic giants (CNN.com, 2014; Graffith-Jones, 2014). 
If these conditions are juxtaposed with the growing discontentment, indeed resentment of the 
developing economies against the traditional international economic institutions 
(International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank), especially given the latter’s penchant 
to undermine the economic institutions of the former through strangulating economic 
policies, the picture becomes grimmer. It is therefore, not surprising that the G20, at their 
recent pre-summit briefing gave the IMF and World Bank an ultimatum which expired 31st 
July, 2014 to initiate reforms or risk mass repudiation of their policies (CNN.com, 2014).  
In view of the above, the growing concern over the placement of Nigeria, arguably one of the 
four largest economies in Africa, by far the continent’s largest market and the 26th largest 
economy globally, with an estimated GDP of $509.9 billion, following the recent rebasing of 
her economy within this emerging developing economic construct, particularly the BRICS 
becomes pertinent (Onu, 2010; Dallaji, 2012; Stuenkel, 2013; Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012; 
Niyi-Akinmade, 2014:29). In other words, the increasing debate on the heels of the 
displacement of South Africa by Nigeria as the largest economy in Africa, following the IMF 
and World Bank monitored rebasing in June, 2014 makes this study very relevant in 
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contemporary international economic relations (CCR Report, 2012; Fioramonti, 2013). More 
so, Nigeria’s radical shift in her foreign economic policy since 1999, which has given rise to 
the increasing penetration of her economy by the BRICS, throws up the complexities in her 
regional economic relations (Alao, 2011; Esidene et al, 2012). 
Furthermore, the discourse on Nigeria’s economic performance over the years has been 
anchored on the country’s benchmark from independence, in comparison to other regional 
powers in Asia and Africa (Onimode, 2000). For instance, Herbst and Mills (2012) argued 
that: 
In 1965, Nigeria had a higher per capita GDP than Indonesia: by 1997, just before 
the financial crash, Indonesia’s per capita GDP had risen to more than three times 
that of Nigeria. Ghana had a higher GNP per capita in 1957 than South Korea. In 
2011, according to the IMF, the average income of South Koreans (US$20 591) was 
about 16 times that of Ghanaians (US$1 312), the former well above and the latter 
well below the global average of US$9 218. When Malaysia gained independence 
in 1957, it had a per capita income less than that of Haiti. But at the end of the 20th 
century, when Haiti was the poorest country in the Americas (with a per capita 
income of US$673), Malaysia (US$8 423) had a standard of living higher than that 
of any major economy in that region, save for the US and Canada. Comparisons 
between Asia and Africa are stark even in the case of countries with similarities in 
their economic make-up and political histories, such as Indonesia and Nigeria 
(Herbst and Mills, 2012:159). 
To this end, contemporary scholars of development studies have postulated acronyms such as 
Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey (MINT); Brazil, South Africa, India and China 
(BASIC); India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA); South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria and Egypt 
(SANE); Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey (MIKT); Northern rim countries – 
Canada, Russia, Scandinavia, and the northern United States (NORCS); Portugal, Italy 
Greece and Spain (PIGS); and Turkey, India, Mexico, Brazil and Indonesia (TIMBI) as 
models of regional political-economic integration (O’ Neil, 2001and 2012; Mokoena, 2007; 
Qi, 2011; Keating, 2012; Stuenkel, 2013). Among these models and constructs, however, 
BRICS model remains the most workable and globally representative in contemporary 
regional economic studies, particularly in the context of South-South Cooperation.  
In view of this background, the paper is divided into four sections, conveniently 
accommodating some sub-sections. Following this introduction, the second part of the paper 
probes into the theoretical issues in foreign economic relations with a view to bridging the 
analytical gaps in literature. The third part of the paper discusses Nigeria’s foreign economic 
relations with the BRICS economies. The fourth section concludes the paper.    
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2 Theoretical Issues in Foreign Economic Relations 
Scholars of international relations and particularly development studies have often viewed 
inter-state relations from the perspective of the North-South divide. The North represents the 
advanced societies of Western Europe, North America and Japan with intimidating Gross 
Domestic Products (GDPs) and other economic indices that suggest development; the South, 
on the other hand represents the countries of Africa, Asia (with the exception of ‘the newly 
industrialised countries’ of East Asia) and Latin America, with low GDPs in the global 
economic mainstream (Therien, 1999; Chidozie, 2014:20).  
This latter group of countries have been characterised as ‘underdeveloped’ countries, with 
‘backward economies’ and by implication, dependent on the former group of countries. To 
this effect, this general description accounts for the structuralists view of international 
system, accentuated by ‘centre/periphery’ or ‘metropole/satellite’ description of the world 
divide between the developed and underdeveloped countries respectively by mainstream 
scholars who belong to the underdevelopment and dependency school of thought (Gunder, 
1967 ; Amin, 1974; Ake, 1981). 
To be sure, the North-South cleavage does continue to be an area of reflection in international 
relations, but for most scholars, however, the parameters of the debate have changed 
radically. Explanations of this evolution vary enormously. For some, new attitudes have 
formed, such that ‘the traditional North-South divide is giving way to a more mature 
partnership’ (Haq, 1995:204). Others maintain that the South - or the Third World – ‘no 
longer exists as a meaningful single entity’, or that it ‘has ceased to be a political force in 
world affairs’, judging by significant differences in their levels of development as a ‘result of 
variations in the gains of globalisation’ (Gilpin, 1987:304).  
Others suggest that ‘the North is generating its own internal South’ and that ‘the South has 
formed a thin layer of society that is fully integrated into the economic North’ (Cox and 
Sinclair, 1996:531). As demonstrated by these myriads of opinions, the image of a 
polarisation between a Northern developed hemisphere and a Southern developing 
hemisphere no longer offers a perfectly clear representation of reality. In short, the 
understanding of international political economy has been substantially transformed over 
recent years; and it is precisely the nature of these transformations that is the focus of this 
study. 
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Similarly, economic foundation of foreign relations has often been ignored in regional 
studies, especially as it concerns developing economies in Africa. The reasons for this lacuna 
in contemporary literature are not far-fetched. The dominance of power politics theories has 
relegated economic factors to a peripheral status and a discussion of economic foreign policy 
raises several theoretical problems, since conventional foreign policy literature does not 
bequeath a theoretical paradigm that is able to synthesize politics and economics, domestic 
and foreign policy and the idea of an economic foreign policy orientation to contemporary 
scholars (Olusanya, 1988; Bangura, 1989; Olukoshi, 1991; Amale, 2002). Indeed, Kunle 
Amuwo’s argument seems apt as he posited that:  
The naivety of African states- and perhaps also the opportunism of their bankrupt 
ruling class- is the tendency to extricate the economy from the political (Amuwo, 
1991:85)   
Attempts made to fill these theoretical gaps in literature have led scholars to re-visit the two 
broad competing models of theoretical understanding that seek to explain international 
economic relations within the context of development. Thus, theorists vary in their 
approaches to the factors that contributed to the development of underdevelopment of the 
Third World countries in relation to developed countries. While the bourgeois scholars 
argued that the underdevelopment and dependency situation of the Third World was due to 
the internal contradictions of this group of countries arising from bad leadership, 
mismanagement of national resources and elevation of personal aggrandisement and 
primordial interests over and above national interest, the neo-Marxian scholars, on the other 
hand, submitted and insisted that, what propelled the development of the developed countries 
also facilitated, in the same measure, the underdevelopment of the underdeveloped countries. 
These, according to the latter group, are colonialism, slave trade and unequal exchange 
(Rosenstein, 1943; Prebisch, 1950; Baran, 1957; Hirschman, 1958; Rostow, 1960; Amin, 
1974; Rodney, 1974; Aluko and Arowolo, 2010). 
Specifically, the thrust of modernisation theories of development is that underdevelopment is 
an original state with the concomitant characteristics of backwardness or traditionalism, and 
that abandoning these characteristics and embracing those of the developed countries 
constitutes the route to economic development and cultural change (Martinussen, 1999). On 
the other hand, underdevelopment and dependency theories contend that, underdevelopment, 
far from being an original or natural condition of the poor societies, is a condition imposed by 
the international expansion of capitalism and its inalienable partner, imperialism (Offiong, 
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1981; Landes, 2000). That is to say, African, indeed Third World underdevelopment is the 
result of economic imperialism and the consequent dependency.  
3 Nigeria and the BRICS Economies  
An attempt is made in the following section to delineate the dynamics of Nigeria’s foreign 
economic relations with the BRICS countries.  
3.1 Nigeria and Brazil 
Nigeria and Brazil signed a bilateral agreement in September 2005 which was targeted at 
cementing their economic and cultural ties. The agreement focused on four major areas of 
trade and investment, technical co-operation, cultural revival and regular political 
consultations. Since then, the value of bilateral trade has reached over $2 billion and the joint 
co-operation profile has covered virtually every facet of human activity (Alao, 2011:19). To 
be sure, between 2003 and 2005, Nigeria’s merchandise exports to Brazil increased from 
nearly $1.5 billion to $5 billion, climaxing at $8.2 billion in 2008, thus, placing Nigeria as the 
fifth-highest exporter of goods to Brazil, after the US, Germany, Argentina and China and 
making Brazil currently the second largest importer of Nigerian products worldwide (Alao, 
2011:9).  
The bulk of Nigeria’s trade with Brazil is in oil and gas; and Nigeria is Brazil’s largest source 
of petroleum. However, in recent times the two countries have identified other areas of 
mutually beneficial trade and co-operation. According to the report released by the African 
Development Bank Group (ADBG, 2011), Nigeria and Brazil have perceived the need to 
collaborate in the area of drugs and narcotics control; and most importantly, bio-fossils and 
its use of ethanol as an alternative to fuel (where Brazil has assumed a global leadership) as 
issues of potential interest between the two countries. To this end, Brazil announced the plan 
to build a ‘Biofuel Town’ in Nigeria in 2007 and proposed initial project of US$100 million 
for the production of Ethanol from sugar cane and palm oil (ADBG, 2011:5).  
Furthermore, Nigeria and Brazil signed a joint agreement on energy co-operation in August 
2009, following which an Energy Commission was established between the two countries. 
Consequently, Brazil expressed interest in completing the development of the Zungeru 
Hydropower Plant and financing the Mambilla Hydropower Project under a partnership that 
would allow the country to help develop Nigeria’s power industry. In return for Brazil’s 
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participation in two hydropower projects, Nigeria will grant the former access to its oil and 
gas industry (Alao, 2011:20).  
However, the most recent effort between Nigeria and Brazil to foster co-operation in trade 
and investment was the establishment of a Bi-National Commission, which was set up in 
2012, under the auspices of the Nigerian-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(NBCCI). In this regard, the Chamber has provided the vehicle for forging bilateral ties 
between both countries by successfully organising two Brazilian Official Trade Missions to 
Nigeria in 2013, and a reciprocal Trade Mission to Brazil in the same year. These Trade 
Missions covered various areas of business endeavours, including Agricultural and Agro-
Allied, Technology, Infrastructure, Power, Mining, Oil and Gas, Construction, Commerce, 
Aviation, Finance/Banking, Women Empowerment, Culture and Tourism (NBCCI Report, 
2012).   
3.2 Nigeria and Russia 
Russo-Nigerian relations have progressed considerably since the latter’s independence 
culminating in the signing of series of Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs) in 2008. The 
first of these agreements was to regulate the peaceful use of nuclear energy, while the second 
envisaged the participation of Gazprom, the Russian-based energy corporation, in the 
exploration and development of oil wells and gas reserves in Nigeria. Specifically, Russia’s 
economic interest in Nigeria is in the areas of infrastructure development, the ferrous and 
nonferrous metals industry, electric power generation, including nuclear energy, and the 
extraction of hydrocarbon and other raw minerals. For its part, Nigeria is interested in the 
electricity sector (Alao, 2011:15). 
In recent time however, Nigeria and Russia have started exploring discussions on space 
technology, nuclear energy and partnership in other technical fields. The countries have 
signed a nuclear agreement between the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority and the 
Russian State Atomic Corporation to explore and develop gas and hydrocarbon-related 
projects in Nigeria. In 2010 trade, between the two countries reached $300 million, having 
recorded a balance of trade to the tune of $1.5 billion mark in 2009; thus Nigeria became 
Russia’s second-largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa after South Africa (Anofi, 
2010; Alao, 2011:15).   
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3.3 Nigeria and India 
Nigeria and India signed strategic partnership deal called the Abuja Declaration, comprising 
four agreements: two MOUs on promoting interaction between foreign office backed 
institutes; one MOU on defence co-operation; and a protocol for foreign office consultations. 
Prior to this time, Nigeria and India had lacked institutional framework to back investments 
and commerce, thus, it was agreed that these pacts would set the stage for a more intensive 
relationship between the two countries. Thus, the areas covered by the Abuja Declaration 
were keys to promoting trade, investment and cultural exchange programme between both 
countries (Alao, 2011:18). 
Ugo (2010) argued that the understanding of Nigeria-India relations would be better situated 
within the context of the dominant competition between India and China, two leading 
countries in the BRICS bloc. According to her, India, like China is positioning itself to 
becoming an economic power in the next decade. She asserted that India is the largest 
democracy in the world, with an estimated 1.2 billion population, behind China’s 1.4 billion; 
world leader in innovation of ultra inexpensive cars, produces the lowest cost car in the world 
– the “Nano” car from Tata Motors and pulling her weight also in supplying global human 
resources, as well as in computer software business. She submitted that, India is currently the 
12th largest economy in the world based on World Bank rating and also ranked the 45th in the 
internationally respected Legatum Prosperity Index, 2009. 
With these economic credentials, Nigeria cannot ignore her relations with India in the 21st 
century international economic relations. According to Alao (2011), Nigeria’s contemporary 
relations with India are in the areas of trade and commerce, even though their relations cut 
across a broad spectrum. He argued that trade between the two countries by 2010 was 
approximately $10.7 billion, of which $8.7 billion was to Nigeria’s advantage. He stressed 
that, by this figure, Nigeria is currently believed to be India’s largest trading partner in 
Africa. He concluded that the key areas identified include oil and gas (Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation Videsh Limited), medical and pharmaceutics, banking (involvement with the 
IBTC), telecommunication (Bharti Airtel invested $600 million to take over Zain in 2010), 
retail, movies and entertainment, and vehicle importation (DANA and Stallion Groups) 
(Alao, 2011:18). 
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3.4 Nigeria and China 
Given the dynamic nature of China’s growing engagement with Africa, as well as the ad hoc 
and limited engagement that preceded it, an examination of Nigeria-China relations is mostly 
grounded in an assessment of how the rising interest of China in Africa significantly affects 
Sino-Nigeria relations. In other words, an appraisal of Nigeria-China relations must 
necessarily be seen in the light of the dynamics of China’s renewed engagement with Africa, 
especially since the end of the Cold War in 1989 (Srinivasan, 2008:334; Alli, 2010:105; 
Ariyo, 2010:134; Oche, 2010:139). In view of the controversy that has bedevilled the 
relations between Nigeria and China, attempt has been made in scholarly circles to describe 
the nature of their engagement as “that of a giant to a bigger giant” (Owoeye and Kawonishe, 
2007:534) and “a friendship between most unequal equals” (Bukarambe, 2005:249).  
Indeed, nowhere is this lopsided relationship more pronounced than in the area of economic 
transactions – a prevailing feature of the international economic diplomacy of the 21st 
century. According to Bukarambe (2005), the economic points of contact between Nigeria 
and China are so diverse to the extent that the latter’s advantages are very manifest and the 
former has no reciprocity. He argued that, in view of the first bilateral trade agreement signed 
between the two countries on November 3, 1972, (other agreements have long been added to 
this), Chinese companies have been involved in projects covering roads and bridges, ports, oil 
fields, bore holes, agriculture, and power distribution/supply. He stressed that China 
acknowledges that up to 90 Chinese companies are involved in Nigeria in various sectors 
covering trade, investments and construction (Bukarambe, 2005:252). 
Bukarambe (2005) further cited Chinese Haier Company which is involved with PZ in the 
production of air-conditioners, electronics and refrigerators; China National Petroleum 
Company (CNPC) and the China National Petroleum and Chemicals Corporation (CNPCC), 
which are engaged in construction in association with Shell Petroleum (the largest foreign Oil 
Company in Nigeria) and development of marginal fields respectively, as veritable examples 
of Chinese trade interests in Nigeria. He submitted that, in all, Chinese construction 
companies got contracts worth up to $200 million in 2000 (Bukarambe, 2005). These 
extensive trade relations warranted that, by 2009, Nigeria was among the leading two-way 
trade partners of China in Africa, alongside countries such as Angola, South Africa and 
Sudan; and the second-highest African importer from China, after South Africa (Alao, 
2011:16). 
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In the same vein, Owoeye and Kawonishe (2007), argued that one major problem in the 
relationship between Nigeria and China is the permanent trade deficit. According to them, 
since the formalisation of relations in 1971, the balance of trade has always been in favour of 
China. They stressed that, although trade between both states reached $1.86 billion in 2003 
representing a 59% growth and further grew by 17.6% to $609 million with Nigeria’s export 
to China registering a growth of 330%, during the first four months of 2004; and in April 
2011, trade between the two countries had reached a new height of $ 7.76 billion, thus 
making Nigeria the fourth-largest trading partner and the second-largest export market of 
China in Africa, Nigeria still recorded a balance of trade deficit. They attributed this trade 
imbalance to the nature of Chinese export and import to Nigeria, showing that China 
exported manufactured and industrial items to Nigeria and imported unprocessed agricultural 
and mineral items from it. They concluded that, China has set up more than thirty solely 
funded companies and joint ventures in Nigeria, confirming that the former has a net 
industrial and developmental advantage over Nigeria (Owoeye and Kawonishe, 2007:544).  
By way of comparative advantage, Aja (2012) posits that, Nigeria is still a struggling 
economy while China is both the fastest growing and second largest economy in the world. 
According to him, the present locale of China in the world economic system cannot be 
ignored by a struggling economy like Nigeria, and logically too, in a fast changing world 
system, China cannot ignore Nigeria in both economic and overall strategic considerations in 
Africa. He stressed that Nigeria remains a potential market in the world at any time, and 
strategically, China needs Nigeria to consolidate its new-found relations in Africa. He 
however, regrets that Nigeria’s new relationship with China will be conditioned by the 
structural economic dependency factor against Nigeria, concluding that while China’s 
economy is heavily diversified with the capacity building to export varieties of produce, 
Nigeria is still overdependent on oil as the commanding height of its economy (Aja, 2012). 
Incidentally, Alao (2011) argued that although China has a range of interests in Nigeria, its 
main trade interest is oil. According to him, several oil deals have been signed over the last 
few years, the most significant being the agreement that involved China investing $4 billion 
in Nigeria’s infrastructure in return for the first refusal rights on four oil blocks in 2008. He 
stressed that at the centre of most of Nigeria’s economic diplomacy towards China, is the 
principle of ‘exchanging oil for development’, citing a number of rail construction contracts 
signed in April 2011 between the Nigerian Government and a Chinese company named 
China Gezhouba Group Corporation, such as the three Eastern rail lines (463 kilometre from 
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Port Harcourt to Makurdi; the 1, 016 kilometre line from Makurdi to Kuru, with the inclusion 
of the spur lines to Jos and Kafanchan; and the 640 kilometre line from Kuru to Makurdi) as a 
validation of such diplomatic engagement. He concluded that, this oil for development deal 
inevitably put China on a collision course with Nigerian militants fighting the Nigerian state 
over the management of oil in the country’s Niger Delta, a course that manifested in hostage 
taking of the Chinese oil workers and the consequent payment of ransoms to free the workers 
(Alao, 2011). 
Salter (2009), on the other hand, however, contended that the ‘oil for infrastructure’ model 
adopted by former President Obasanjo in his dealings with China is dead. According to him, 
the model has been replaced by one in which Chinese energy companies gain access to the 
country’s oil resources by buying stakes in established companies. He argued that the 
termination of the ‘oil for infrastructure’ approach by the current Nigerian government 
demonstrates an incompatibility between this model and the Nigerian electoral cycle, which 
is designed to alternate rule by rotating power among different personalities with varying 
ideologies. He nonetheless anticipated that Chinese multinational companies that would have 
benefited from these infrastructure projects would continue to grow their Nigerian market 
share due to their competitive advantages in price, risk appetite and access to credit. He 
concluded that the Nigerian government would derive more benefit from its relations with 
China first by improving its negotiation capacity and, secondly, through a re-evaluation of its 
negotiation positions, drawing on the experience of China in its dealings with the West, 
particularly concerning technology transfer and concessional credit (Salter, 2009).  
3.5 Nigeria and South Africa 
In the received literature on African politics, scholars have expressed concern on the nature 
of the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa and the exact roles they are expected to 
play in the continent’s development. Even though, scholars are already contesting the 
hegemonic status of Nigeria and South Africa in Africa, others have reached a consensus on 
the historical roles these countries have been playing in the continent (Gwendolyn and 
Lyman, 2001; Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003; Alden and Soko, 2005; Adebajo, 2007; 
Landsberg, 2008; Mikell, 2008; Chidozie, 2012; Dallaji, 2012; Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012). 
In comparative terms, Nigeria and South Africa remain Africa’s regional economic and 
military powerhouses. Together, they account for 55% of the total Gross National Product 
(GNP) of the African continent and represent 25% of the population of the continent. As 
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centres of political, economic, military and diplomatic gravity in West and Southern Africa, 
Nigeria and South Africa respectively have risen to and fulfilled the popular expectation that 
both of them, working together and sharing broadly the same goals for Africa, are capable of 
positively influencing developments in Africa in the image of their political preferences 
(Akindele, 2007:317; Dallaji, 2012:267). 
On the economic sphere, the difference between the two countries is also clear. Following a 
recent re-basing exercise of Nigeria’s GDP conducted by a team of local and international 
experts, including officials of International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the 
African Development Bank (ADB) which took care of some sectors of her economy that have 
taken dominance since 1990, such as telecommunications, information technology, music, 
online sales, airlines, and Nollywood film production, the country’s GDP rating was 
dramatically altered. Consequently Nigeria’s GDP is at $509.9 billion above that of South 
Africa (Niyi-Akinmade, 2014:30).  Similarly, over the next four decades, for instance, 
Nigeria’s economy is expected to grow at between 5% and 7%, which is almost twice that of 
South Africa with a projected real GDP growth rate of 3.5% (Onu, 2010; Centre for Conflict 
Resolution, CCR, 2012:3). 
Thus, Nigeria-South Africa bilateral relations is shaped by the fact that South Africa is the 
continent’s strongest and most versatile economy, while Nigeria is Africa’s largest consumer 
market (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003; Agbu, 2010; Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012). We 
therefore note that, while South Africa has advantage over Nigeria in areas of technology and 
infrastructure, Nigeria has the advantages of large market potentials for investment and large 
pool of human resource. Furthermore, Nigeria’s trade link to South Africa is through one 
commodity (oil), while South Africa’s trade is diverse and includes a range of products that 
Nigeria’s massive consumer market clearly wants. Indeed, by June 2002, Nigeria had become 
South Africa’s largest trading partner in Africa behind Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Zambia. 
In West Africa, Nigeria is already South Africa’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade 
increasing from $100 million in 1999 to reach $5 billion in 2012 (Zabadi and Onuoha, 
2012:397). 
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Table 1: Overview of Nigeria and the BRICS 
 NIGERIA  BRAZIL RUSSIA INDIA CHINA SOUTH 
AFRICA 
POPULATION 160 Million  199 Million 144 Million 1.2 Billion 1.43 Billion 51 Million 
GDP PER 
PERSON 
$2 500 $10 800 $15 900 $3 500 $7 600 $6 000 
INFANT 
MORTALITY 
PER 
THOUSAND 
91.54 21.170 10.8 47.57 16.6 10.5 
LIFE 
EXPECTANCY 
(YEARS) 
47.56 73.43 69 65.47 73.48 52.61 
KEY IMPORTS Machinery, 
Chemicals, 
Manufacture
d goods 
Machinery Machinery, 
Iron and 
Steel 
Crude Oil, 
Fertilizer 
Crude Oil, 
Mineral 
Fuel, 
Metal, 
Organic 
Chemicals  
Crude Oil, 
Mineral Fuel 
KEY EXPORTS Petroleum, 
Cocoa, 
Rubber 
Transport 
Equipment, 
Coffee 
Wood and 
Chemicals 
Machinery, 
Iron and 
Steel, 
Chemicals 
Electrical 
and other 
Machinery, 
Textiles, 
Iron Ore 
Machinery, 
Iron and 
Steel, Motor 
Vehicles, 
Cane Sugar 
Sources: Alao, A (2011) Nigeria and the BRICs: Diplomatic, Trade, Cultural and Military 
Relations. South Africa: SAIIA, Occasional Paper No. 101; Chidozie, F.C (2014) 
Dependency or Cooperation?: Nigeria-South Africa Relations (1960-2007). Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, Covenant University, Ota: Nigeria; World Bank (Stuenkel, 2013:312) 
 
4 Conclusion and Recommendations   
This paper has attempted to situate Nigeria in the current regional politico-economic 
construct, BRICS. It argued that the BRICS has remained the most viable and globally 
representative model for driving development among emerging economies. This has become 
more relevant in view of the fact that the current economic crises in Europe have defied every 
foreseeable solution, even by the IMF and the World Bank. Indeed, previously strong 
economic giants like Britain, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Greece and the United States have 
become sources of concern to many international observers. The recent collapse of the French 
government and its subsequent replacement with a new administration, the latest in the series 
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of economic risk that Europe has become makes the situation bleaker. In view of this, the 
study makes a very strong case for South-South political-economic cooperation as the only 
sustainable catalyst for global dominance. 
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